How Europe Should Navigate Trump

In just two months in office, U.S. President Donald Trump has roiled relations with key allies. Europe, in particular, has been jolted on several fronts: By Trump’s threats to invade Greenland; his steep tariffs; his scolding of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office; and Vice President J.D. Vance’s now infamous speech in Munich last month, where he also met with the head of a far-right party, angering German officials.

How should Europe respond? How long would it take for the continent to be more independent with regards to security and defense? On this week’s FP Live, I wanted to speak with two former foreign ministers who were able to speak freely about Europe’s options. Arancha González Laya was the foreign minister of Spain between 2020 and 2021, and Gabrielius Landsbergis was the foreign minister of Lithuania from 2020 to 2024. Subscribers can watch the full discussion on the video box atop this page or follow the FP Live podcast. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript. 

Ravi Agrawal: I vividly remember chatting with you both in person immediately after that J.D. Vance speech in Munich. Gabrielius, you told me, “If that wasn’t a wake-up call for Europe, I don’t know what is.” It’s been a month now. Has Europe woken up?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: It has, to some extent. We are certainly witnessing change in Europe. Europe is, for the first time ever, declaring its preparedness to invest in its own defense and removing the limitations for borrowing from member states when they need money for defense. Self-sufficiency and defending the European continent have become the main narratives in Brussels.

But it is a process. I’m far from optimistic or complacent. It’s been more than a month and there has been no proposal from the EU toward Ukraine. We must understand that there is no safe Europe if Ukraine is forced to capitulate. So there’s still more work to be done.

RA: Arancha, you felt similarly in Munich, and told me that “J.D. Vance has done more for European integration than the American Founding Fathers. He wants to destroy the EU from within.” One month on, is Europe responding the way it needs to?

Arancha González : Europe has had to make a very tough decision and realize that if it wants to remain democratic, independent, and united, it has to take its future into its own hands. The EU has seriously started to do this, especially in the unexpected areas of security and defense. I would quote the newly elected chancellor of Germany saying very clearly that the EU can no longer rely on the U.S. as its security and defense ally.

RA: Let’s talk about Ukraine, which is obviously related to European defense. Trump and [Russian President Vladimir] Putin spoke on the phone this week. Trump has also spoken with Zelensky. The White House has said both calls were good. But what do you make of the fact that these talks are underway largely without Europe?

GL: It is disturbing, because Europe’s future is being discussed there. It’s not just Ukraine. If we’re talking about security and defense, Europe cannot stop at the European Union border. I’m really concerned that Trump and Putin are considering the recognition of certain occupied territories in Ukraine. We have not seen this since World War II. It would be a return to zones of influence, as Americans are telling Russians that they can have as much as they can grab. For Putin, it means the doors are open. Only his power and ambition would limit how far he would be willing to go. I don’t think this has yet been internalized by European leaders, but it will definitely not stop in Ukraine. And if Americans are no longer there, it’s our duty to stop Russians in Ukraine and not allow their ambition to go beyond that.

RA: Arancha, do you trust Putin not to attack again? Assuming not, what steps does Europe need to take?

AG: So far, we have only seen the U.S. negotiating with itself. We have not seen Russia negotiating. Russia expressed what it would like this negotiation to be about and what its preferred results are. They want to severely limit Ukraine’s ability to be a sovereign, independent, and territorially integral country. So it’s not as if there is a negotiation.

We have to be very careful not to give the impression that we are in a hurry. And I would like the U.S. not to give the impression of rushing. Revealing that you’re hurrying emboldens Russia. So what do we do? We have to strengthen the hand of Ukraine, which is the country that has been invaded. How do you do that? Put Ukraine in a strong position to enter a negotiation, to not concede before they even get to the table, not to diminish Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. Because let’s face it, the attacks continue. We need peace through strength.

RA: But Arancha, just to channel the Trump administration’s viewpoint, they would argue that the Biden approach was incremental. The heavy losses on both sides would have continued for too long if they hadn’t stepped in and begun these talks. How would you respond to that?

AG: It’s not as if Europe does not want peace. Europe was born to defend and uphold peace in the European continent. But peace is not appeasing the invaders so that they can come back again.

So let’s move toward the objective of a peace agreement without weakening the hand of Ukraine, without questioning or diminishing the position of Ukraine’s president, by continuing to support Ukraine so they can enter into those negotiations from strength. I would tell the Trump administration the same thing I would tell the Biden administration or any other administration, or even Russia: Europe wants peace, but it wants a just, long-lasting peace. The adjectives matter as much as the nouns. It must be long-lasting and just; we’re not looking for surrender.

Read More

It’s Time for Europe to Do the Unthinkable

Brussels has slavishly followed Washington for too long—and forgotten how to advance its own geopolitical interests.

Argument

|

Kishore Mahbubani

What the World Will Look Like Without a ‘West’

The global order has faced challenges before, but Trump 2.0 is different.

Argument

|

Howard W. French

Europe’s Economic Decoupling From America Is Underway

Facing the threat of U.S. tariffs, the EU is looking for free trade elsewhere.

Analysis

|

Anchal Vohra

RA: Gabrielius, the reality is that there has been a dramatic shift in American posture and in the thinking of the White House. And we just ran a piece by Edward Lucas that argued that Trump’s behavior on Ukraine looks a lot like what Russia would want. What do you make of that?

 GL: Well, the previous administration tried to balance battlefield strength so Ukraine could resist but not overpower the Russians. The Biden team thought that would avoid escalation and minimize nuclear threats. For Ukrainians, that was quite drastic because they were bleeding slowly; they were slowly losing people. The war was basically unwinnable with these conditions. 

Now Trump is actually putting weight on the Russian side of the scale. The methods used to strong-arm Zelensky to go to the negotiating table—removing intelligence sharing, limiting weapons so they no longer reach Ukraine, the harassment in the Oval Office—are not reciprocated toward Putin. There were no talks about limitations. There were vague talks about sanctions or tariffs. I have difficulty understanding how you can tariff Russia, where the trade between the U.S. and Russia is only 2 percent of the U.S. trade portfolio. So it’s not even a threat. Then Putin says that he is rejecting the cease-fire, and he issues his own conditions for further negotiations, and everybody’s OK with it.

So I see the United States choosing a side and standing with Vladimir Putin. And that is a strategy because it tells Ukraine and Europe that they will need to fight on two fronts. It says, “Take any deal that is offered for you because you already found it difficult to fight off Russia. Now we have to fight a Russia that is being assisted by the Americans.” So it is a very dark scenario.

But, not to be pessimistic, Europe has instruments. I’d like to compliment Arancha for mentioning that we are able to make Ukraine stronger. For example, President [Emmanuel] Macron said France would be ready to send troops without asking permission from Putin because it’s a sovereign right of France to send troops and a sovereign right of Ukraine to accept them. Ukraine can use this as leverage in the negotiation. With frozen assets, if we cannot take them all, let’s start slicing them up and telling Russians that we will use it all if they don’t stop the war. Out of the 200 billion [euros] that we have, let’s take 20 and spend it on Ukrainian industry to produce more of the drones that they are so efficient with. It sends a signal and creates leverage on the Ukrainian side. On the European side, we can find creative ways to put Ukraine in a very different position.

RA: Arancha, defense is at the core of this discussion. How long would it take for Europe to be solely responsible for its defense? 

AG: Defense takes time, but you have to start. This has already started in Brussels and in European Union member states. Just this week, we saw a clear signal coming out of Germany, a 500 billion [euro] bill for investment, including investments in defense and security. So spending more at the national level, spending better, being more efficient, making sure that we don’t duplicate or triplicate the efforts, that we streamline, that we connect our armies, that we connect our defense equipment. And then, spending and investing together. A hundred fifty billion has already been put toward purchasing weapons together, including with countries that have defense and security compacts with the European Union, which the U.S. does not have. These are massive investments, so it will take time. But what matters today is to put the money where the mouth is, and then to send a signal that this is an inevitable direction that the EU will take. 

Frankly, if you ask any European, they would prefer doing this together with the U.S. as an ally, because we understand that in today’s world, alliances matter. And that was a very strong and deterring alliance. But if that is not an option, the EU will go its own way.

RA: Gabrielius, are Europeans willing to give up spending in other areas to spend more on defense? In France, for example, something as simple as changing working hours or taxing fuel has led to mass protests and weakened the French government. It is not that easy to redirect public finances toward defense. This will come at a huge cost.

GL: I agree with you, not just with the question, but also with the notion that it’s not easy and it has not become way easier now. There are at least two strategic cultures in Europe. You take the Eastern flank, you take Northern Europe, and you have a strategic culture that’s built on defending your country from Russian attack. And then you have Western Europe, where there are countries who are still debating spending 2 percent on defense. 

We are on a path. But Putin has been on that path for three years already. He has built up capacity right now. He has a huge army that is battle-hardened, trained, and bloodthirsty. And even if there’s a cease-fire, is he going to demobilize 1.5 million people? Or is he going to place them in Belarus, in Transnistria, in occupied territories of Georgia? We need to keep these questions in mind because they will probably need answers very soon. I hope that we still have enough time to prepare for those answers.

RA: Arancha, I just want to linger on that point about the differing approaches among European countries, North and Eastern flanks on the one hand and the Western ones on the other. I am going to point out here that Spain spends less on defense as a percentage of GDP than most other NATO countries. What is your sense about that divide?

AG: Well, first, there is a different perception of the threats. If you are sitting where Gabrielius is sitting, in Vilnius, you look east. If you are sitting in my country, you look south. It’s not that there are no menaces; it’s that the menaces are different. The perception is different, but the determination has to be collective. 

In my country, Spain, a country that suffered a lot during the last financial crisis, where defense spending suffered also from the austerity measures that we had to take at that time, I would point out that the current government has moved from 0.9 to 1.3 percent of defense spending over the last six years, which shows a serious commitment to the 2 percent target. 

Now essentially, we need to find out where we have gaps in the EU defense necessities that may require additional spending. And this is where the discussion about defense spending has to be put together with another discussion we have in Europe, too, about integrating our financial markets. The European Union is a very rich continent with lots of savings. But the fragmentation of the European financial market makes these savings fly to the United States rather than investing in Europe. Well, now we have a necessity, to make sure that the savings that exist in the European Union can be capitalized to invest in the protection of European citizens. And this means integrating more of the financial markets. Integrating the European capital markets is not a new objective, but it has gathered new momentum because we realize that we need to leverage all available resources toward protecting the European citizen without, of course, giving up what is very cherished for the European citizen: its own welfare state.

RA: Arancha, I want to turn now to trade. You have a lot of experience in this area. You’ve worked at the WTO [World Trade Organization] in a very senior role. And I remember the first time I met you, you were quite angry about the Biden administration’s protectionism, with the IRA [Inflation Reduction Act] and related initiatives. How are you thinking today about Trump’s threats of tariffs, and what ammunition does the EU actually have at its disposal? 

AG: History demonstrates that trade wars, which is what we are headed toward, are lose-lose wars. It always ends in creating pain without much gain. But now we are risking a lot of pain and no gains. And this is what we have to avoid.

And I’m saying this because I see a difference between the first Trump administration and this one regarding tariffs. We are seeing tariffs at a much higher scale, with a much broader scope, and mostly to achieve objectives that don’t have to do with international trade: fighting against drug trafficking, obtaining passage through a canal, getting this or that territory. And this is a very different proposition.

As far as the European Union is concerned, Ravi, I think the strategy is pretty clear. We do not want a trade war. We will not be the ones triggering a war, but we will not stand idle if the United States decides that it wants to impose massive pain on the European trade and economic tissue. We will respond. We will remain calm. We’ll remain united. Let’s remember that trade is a competence that the EU runs at the EU level. It’s not national competence. And three, we will remain determined. You saw the United States impose unjust tariffs on the European steel and aluminum exports. And two minutes later, the European [Union] replied.

We have a lot of tools in the arsenal. There is a great paper that the European Council on Foreign Relations has released this week detailing what options the European Union has available, but let me be very clear, the European Union will defend its interest. It will be Euro first. It will be about defending European interests. Now we will do this also—and you have started to see this already—by striking new trade deals with other partners around the world. We did this with the countries of the Mercosur at the end of last year. We did this with Switzerland, and we are close to doing this with a number of trading partners in Southeast Asia. Many are queuing up to strike deals with the European Union. India is there; countries in the Gulf are there. Why? Because we all feel how important it is to keep markets open to each other, especially if the United States decides to go in the opposite direction.

RA: Gabrielius, Arancha mentioned growing trade ties with other parts of the world, but where does China fit into this, both from a trade perspective, but also potentially a security perspective?

GL: China’s interests haven’t changed. They clearly want to see their role growing, creating new leverages, strengthening them internally and externally. There are people who are suggesting that President Trump’s approach to Russia is sort of a reverse Kissinger move, trying to split Russia and China. The president mentioned envisioning that ties would weaken. I find it hard to understand how that would work, but there is an additional Kissinger moment here, which China could be playing to split Europe and the United States. And even in the Munich Security Conference, China was very active, very supportive, and very understanding of European security needs. And then later on, when Europe was not invited to Riyadh, Chinese reaction was that they think that it’s imperative for Europe to sit at the table. So they are striking all the right notes for at least the part of Europe that is really, really worried. I think that they are playing the smart, subtle game much like what Henry Kissinger played in the Soviet Union and China in the ’70s. Whether they will be successful, I’m not sure. China is not a benevolent player. Maybe it cannot entirely split Europe from the United States, but offering more opportunities that seem plausible and needed for Europe maybe can.

RA: Arancha, China scholars often say that when Beijing talks about multipolarity it is code for Western decline. Are we witnessing the end of the Western-led liberal order?

AG: Well, let me answer this question by linking it to the previous one. What if the United States strikes a deal with China, and the European Union becomes the variable of adjustment of that agreement? That concerns me. We should not ignore the admiration that the U.S. president has expressed for the Chinese president. 

So to go back to your question, how does the world look like today? Well, it’s relatively few players on the defense side, very multipolar on the economic side, and very multipolar on the technology side, where the powers are not states, they are businesses. It is kaleidoscopic, more than multipolar. And we are seeing this at play in the United States when the distinction between state and business becomes blurred, especially in the technology space.